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Whatever you think of Bertrand Russell’s famous claim that the ‘law of causal-
ity’ is (at least as of 1912) redundant in the ‘advanced sciences’, it is nonethe-
less the case that a variety of concepts tangled up with the idea of causation —
such as determinism and locality — remain ubiquitous within physics and else-
where across the sciences. Yemima Ben-Menahem’s excellent book, Causation in
Science, focuses not on reductive metaphysical accounts of these notions but in-
stead the roles they play within physics, and the relationships that hold between
them, through a series of detailed historical case studies. The book is a highly-
informed, illuminating and detailed analysis of these causal notions central to
scientific practice, with many highly novel discussions about their nuanced rela-
tionships, and as such it adds significantly towards the philosophy of causation
and philosophy of science more generally, and also sets out a number of new ap-
proaches for philosophers of science to explore regarding the nature of causality
and causal reasoning. In this review, I set out the main aims and themes of the
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book, assess whether the types of physical constraints explored by the book de-
serve the name ‘causal’, and discuss what really hangs on the distinction between
causal and non-causal constraints in physics.
2 Aims of the book
So what is causation? Clearly it’s a much-used term within science, but there
are many different concepts that have come to be called ‘causal’ across the sci-
ences for varying reasons rarely set out or justified by the authors of published
scientific research. Ben-Menahem takes on an important and difficult task: to
disentangle various instances of a particular class of causal notions in fundamen-
tal science — constraints — and to trace the relationships between them. Among
these, the book provides analyses of the following: determinism; stability; local-
ity; symmetry; conservation laws; and least action principles. Finally the topic of
causal reductionism is itself tackled in the concluding chapter. As Ben-Menahem
notes, each of these chapters can be taken in isolation from the others, but among
the complex issues covered by the individual chapters there are several back-
ground themes tying the book together: (1) in order to understand the role of
causality in science, philosophers of science should focus more on the concept
of causal constraints and less on causal relations between events; (2) causality
is a ‘cluster concept’ that ranges over a number of interrelated concepts within
science; (3) reductionist accounts of causation in science are largely naïve and
insufficiently motivated by scientific practice.
2.1 Causal Constraints
Causality can lay claim to being the most ambiguous term in science, referring to
a wide range of tenuously related notions, and not clearly to a single concept. It
can be used to refer to global features of the structure of spacetime or to the local
nature of interactions and mechanisms, to a fundamental feature of subatomic
interactions or to an emergent statistical feature of macroscopic systems. As a
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result, many have suggested that we should simply do away with the idea of
causality in physics altogether. Causal notions have been criticised as too vague
and imprecise for science, and as such something to be eradicated. For instance,
Gustav Kirchhoff (1876, p. v) deemed the search for causes in physics as unde-
sirable on the grounds of causal notions being ‘infected by the vagueness from
which the notions of cause of striving cannot be freed’,¹ and Ernst Mach (1906,
p. 278) noted that causal notions ‘lack precision’² and for this reason causality
plays an increasingly minimal role in physics. Others such as Russell and John
Norton (2007) have deemed causality an outdated notion no longer in keeping
with the notions central to fundamental physics.
Various attempts have been made to rehabilitate causality through provid-
ing rigorous analyses of causal relations and causal structure, such as with the
axiomatic accounts of causal modelling of Pearl (2000) and Spirtes et al. (2001).
But Ben-Menahem takes a key aspect of causality in science to be overlooked
by philosophers, namely the role of causal constraints in science. The book,
she notes, ‘seeks to shift our attention from causal relations between individ-
ual events […] to the more general causal constraints found in science, and the
relations between them,’ (p. 1) noting that focus on scientific practice ‘led me
to the conclusion that the notion of causal constraint is far more germane than
that of causal relations between individual events’ (p. ix). The aim is not to sim-
ply shift the focus of philosophers of causation from causal relations to causal
constraints, but rather to ‘suggest a broader perspective on causation and a new
research program for the philosophy of causation’ (p. 1).
2.2 Causal Pluralism
In response to causal sceptics and causal eliminativists like Mach, Russell and
Norton, Ben-Menahem moves away from a singular notion of causation and a
singular account of what causal things have in common: ‘I have relinquished
¹Translation by Frisch (2014, p. 2).
²Translation by Frisch (2014, p. 4).
Review of Causation in Science | Matt FaRR | SeptembeR 23, 2021 4
the search for the definition of causation, instead taking causation to be a cluster
concept comprising a broad range of causal notions’ (p. 9). Instead, she says, the
argument of the book is that ‘as soon as we shift our attention from the familiar
paradigms of breaking a glass or tickling a baby to determinism, locality, stability
and conservation laws, it becomes evident that causal notions permeate funda-
mental science’ (p. 9). There is nothing, she suggests, that ‘is both necessary and
sufficient’ that could constitute a ‘definition of the notion of cause’ that accounts
for the variety of causal notions used in fundamental science, nor some underly-
ing causal principle used within science. Instead, ‘I have therefore relinquished
the quest for such a definition and adopted a pluralistic approach, taking the no-
tion of cause to be an irreducible cluster concept covering various constraints
imposed but the theories we employ’ (p. 12).
2.3 Causal Antireductionism
Through its focus on scientific practice, its pluralistic analysis of causal con-
straints, and its resulting move away from focusing on causal relations between
events, Causation in Science fits with a trend of philosophical analyses of causa-
tion that avoid overly metaphysical analysis. Ben-Menahem stresses she does
not ‘aspire to completeness’ in her account of causation, nor does she take the
kinds of causal notions discussed to ‘have an a priori basis’ (p. x), noting that
even when such notions stem from ‘deeply rooted intuitions, they are part of
science…[and are] always subject to reevaluation’ (ibid). As such, her analysis
does not amount to a polemical defence of some particular philosophical theory
of causation. But this is not to say that there are no underlying targets of her ap-
proach. The preface notes that ‘[i]n drawing attention to the spectrum of causal
constraints that guide fundamental science, the argument set forth in this book
takes issue with causal eliminativism […and in] elucidating the structure of inter
theoretic relations, it challenges causal reductionism’ (p. xi).
So what we have here is a fascinating book that provides a detailed and
thoroughgoing analysis of the complex relationships between causal constraints
Review of Causation in Science | Matt FaRR | SeptembeR 23, 2021 5
within science and paints a far more nuanced account of causation than that
assumed by causal eliminativists and causal reductionists. Insofar as there is a
central conclusion of this book it is that philosophers have a tendency to try to fit
the world into categories into which it simply does not fit, and that by focusing
on the usage of putative causal notions in scientific practice we can gain nontriv-
ial knowledge about the interplay of notions like determinism, stability, locality
and symmetry, and so better understand the role of causality in science. Pulling
these themes together, the final chapter of the book is ultimately the closest thing
to a polemical take on the philosophy of causation, showing the various pitfalls
that arise from trying to view causation in science through a reductionist lens.
3 Summary of chapters
After setting out the aims and motivations of the book in chapter 1, chapters 2
and 3 discuss the relationship between the notions of determinism and stability.
Alongside a detailed and informative historical overview of different notions of
determinism, Ben-Menahem uses these chapters to explicate what she takes to
be a ‘neglected causal notion’, stability, which she describes as ‘a distinct causal
category, independent of the category of determinism with which it is often con-
flated’ (p. 60). Stability is introduced as a property of states to which systems
return after ‘having been subject to small changes’, and is a widespread notion
within physics, particularly in statistical mechanics (the main topic of chapter
3) when dealing with things like equilibrium states. Stability is causal in Ben-
Menahem’s terms precisely because it concerns the notion of change over time
— the property of stability acts as a constraint on how much a system changes in
certain physical interactions.
As Ben-Menahem stresses, determinism is a notion that has changed from
being generally understood in causal terms, such as that the same causes lead
to same effects, to noncausal terms, such as that for any particular state of the
world, there is only one possible history compatible with the laws (something
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that led Russell to the conclusion that the determinism of laws of physics is in-
compatible with a causal interpretation). Stability, Ben-Menahem argues, is a
more clearly causal notion, since it concerns how perturbations affect systems,
and system’s tendency to return or fail to return to some particular state given a
certain kind of influence. An ongoing theme through chapters 2 and 3 is that the
distinction between stable and unstable is more useful within science than the
distinction between necessity and contingency. Thinking in terms of whether
some state arises out of necessity or contingency is inextricably tangled up with
philosophical worries about fatalism, teleology and directionality of processes.
Addressing these related issues, Ben-Menahem provides engaging discussions of
how the concept of stability plays a role in clearing up such worries, such as in
apparently goal-oriented or teleological explanations in evolutionary biology (ch
2), where we see how even contingent processes lead predictably towards some
stable end (such as the evolution of eyes or wings), and the appearance of direc-
tionality in statistical mechanics (ch 3) in the evolution of systems from unstable
low-entropy states to stable high-entropy states.
Chapter 4 takes on the relationship between determinism and locality, some-
thing ‘all but ignored’ within the philosophical literature (p. 83). The chapter
largely focuses on the non-local nature of quantum mechanics and its relation-
ship to relativistic causality (i.e. the kind of locality imposed by special relativity
theory). In analysing the various ways in which determinism and locality im-
pinge upon each other, this chapter produces many important insights into the
causal nature of quantum mechanics. For instance, Ben-Menahem notes that the
regularity of the non-local correlations described by quantummechanics empha-
sises the deterministic nature of quantum mechanics: ‘surprisingly then a grain
of determinism turns out to be necessary, de facto, for nonlocality; it is neces-
sary for the formulation of a nonlocal theory’ (p. 85). As such, (non)locality and
(in)determinism are not fully independent concepts. Indeed, as is well known,
the fact that quantummechanics is both non-local and yet abides by no-signaling
principles, means that the theory has an intriguingly complex causal structure.
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We can better understand this, Ben-Menahem suggests, by focusing on the ‘intri-
cate dance between indeterminism and locality’ (p. 89) performed by the theory:
‘the satisfaction of the no-signaling constraint is made possible by the fact that
QM also accommodates (at least a measure of ) indeterminism’, with the combi-
nation of entanglement and no-signaling ‘strik[ing] a delicate balance between
determinism and indeterminism’ (p. 90). The chapter goes on in detail consider-
ing the balance of determinism and indeterminism in different approaches and
interpretations of quantum mechanics.
In Chapter 5, the focus is shifted to the relationship between symmetries and
conservation laws. Symmetries, Ben-Menahem contends, are causal insofar as
they ‘constrain physical change and physical possibility’ (p. 110). This marks
an interesting take on the use of the term ‘causal’, since symmetry principles
are often appealed to as providing non-causal explanations of processes, an issue
I’ll come back to in more detail below. But the idea here is that since symme-
try principles are routinely appealed to in explanations of why certain systems
evolved some way and not another, and why certain systems could evolve one
way but not another, symmetries are sufficiently connected to the idea of causal
constraints on the evolution of systems as to be causal. Ben-Menahem demon-
strates this in the case of the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP) in an engaging dis-
cussion (pp. 111–115) arguing for the causal role of PEP in the collapse of white
dwarfs in the work of Chandrasekhar, and additionally making the case that PEP
is ‘directly tied to causal considerations’ since it assumes relativistic locality, ul-
timately arguing that PEP is ‘an excellent illustration of the causal function of
symmetries in physics’ (p. 115).
The chapter continues with further reflection on the very meaning of causal-
ity through its discussion of the causal nature of conservation principles. For
instance, Ben-Menahem notes how Niels Bohr and Émile Meyerson understood
causality in terms of conservation, with Bohr using the term ‘causality’ to refer to
the conservation of momentum and energy, and Meyerson poetically noting that
‘the external world […] appears to us as infinitely changing […] yet the principle
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of causality postulates the contrary[, …] change is only apparent; it must neces-
sarily disclose an identity which alone is real’ (Meyerson, 1930, p. 92; quoted by
Ben-Menahem on p. 122). Continuing the consideration of symmetries, the chap-
ter ends with a discussion of Curie’s principle, which Ben-Menahem acknowl-
edges has been criticised on grounds of being tautologous and so not obviously
causal, but responds that understood as a general constraint on change, Curie’s
principle ‘continues to inform the search for a unified picture of the world’ (p.
133).
Chapter 6 presents the final case study of causal constraints, focusing on
the principle of least action and its relationship to teleology, a theme previously
touched upon in chapter 2. For instance, Ben-Menahem notes that Fermat’s prin-
ciple, a precursor of the principle of least action, ‘appears tantalisingly teleolog-
ical’ (p. 142), asking: ‘how can light pick out the right path other than by some
sort of calculation that takes the entire path into account? The very notion of a
path, involving special end points, seems to presuppose goal directness. Indeed,
the principle was criticised straightaway on account of its ostensible ascription
of foreknowledge to nature, in violation of scientific standards’ (Ibid). The dis-
cussion of this chapter is helpfully placed in the context of discussions of teleol-
ogy in the work of Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz and Newton, noting the interplay
of causal and teleological modes of explanation with theological views. For in-
stance, Ben-Menahem notes how Newton’s own theology supported the idea
that God chose a causal over teleological world, as one depending upon initial
rather than final conditions (pp. 139-140). Through the historical and practice-
led approach, this chapter offers an extremely useful presentation of the least
action principle and its role in scientific explanations, and it might have been
interesting to see additional engagement with some of the more recent philo-
sophical work on the principle of least action, and relationships with retrocausal
and time-symmetric formulations of quantum mechanics.
As noted, the final chapter brings the discussion back to traditional philosoph-
ical conceptions of causation with a critique of ‘higher-level eliminativism’ — the
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idea that causality is a fundamental or underlying feature of the world and that
all causal facts are to be found at the fundamental level, with apparent higher-
level causal facts are either reducible to facts about the fundamental level or else
false. Ben-Menahem notes this to be the converse position to ‘causal republi-
canism’, the view defended by Price and Corry (2007) and others, which holds
that while causality is to be eliminated from fundamental physics, causal notions
are nonetheless useful in higher-level and everyday contexts. As Ben-Menahem
presents republicanism, the idea is that there are higher-level but not fundamen-
tal causal facts. While much of the earlier parts of the book can be considered
a response to republicans (and also the other kind of fundamental causal elim-
inativists described by Price & Corry, the causal anarchists), this final chapter
concerns itself solely with higher-level eliminativism, focusing primarily with
problems concerning causal reduction and emergence. Ben-Menahem rounds
the book off with an intriguing discussion of the idea of lawlessness in physics,
and how the notion of lawlessness relates to our sense of human freedom.
4 Discussion: ‘Causal’ vs ‘noncausal’ constraints;
What’s in a name?
There has been much work in the past decade in philosophy of science on the
apparent role of noncausal explanations in science (see for instance Lange (2016),
Reutlinger (2017) and Reutlinger and Saatsi (2018)). This is a literature that re-
ceives little discussion in the book despite the overlapping themes. In particular,
Lange (2011, 2013, 2016, 2018) refers to ‘explanations by constraint’ as noncausal
explanations; for Lange, explanations by constraint exhibit explanations of facts
that are modally stronger than causal explanations (in Lange’s words, they pro-
vide a ‘a stronger variety of necessity’ (2018, p. 27)). In other words, the relevant
explanandum is constrained to be some particular way by a non-causal fact, such
as the holding of a particular symmetry principle:
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[S]patiotemporal symmetries and the principle of relativity do not
describe causal relations […, r]ather, they impose constraints on the
laws of nature; they require that the laws of nature take a certain
form. […] Similarly, the fact that the spacetime interval is invariant
is not a matter of the world’s network of causal relations. (Lange,
2013, p. 494)
But how does Ben-Menahem’s account of constraints as causal relate to Lange’s?
The parallels with Lange’s account of explanations by constraint is acknowledged
on pp. 15-16 of the book, though not at great length. As Ben-Menahem notes,
one key difference here is terminological: ‘whereas the constraints I speak of
are causal, [Lange] deems explanation by constraint noncausal, implying that
the notions of cause and constraint exclude each other’ (p. 15). Ben-Menahem
relates this to her wider pluralism about causality, noting that ‘[t]he inclusive
concept of causation as comprising any constraint on change, regardless of its
place in the hierarchy of laws, affords a better understanding of the function
of causal notions in science’ (p. 16). This picks on the key rule of thumb in Ben-
Menahem’s notion of causation — for something to be regarded as causal, it must
be associated in the right way with time and change.
I understand causal constraints as general constraints on change. As
such they constitute the conceptual scaffolding of the natural sci-
ences, and differ from purely mathematical constraints, which are
indifferent to temporal change and evolution. (p. x)
Such a condition is hard to make strict since many of the key cases in the
debate about non-causal explanations in science involve things that are atypi-
cal with respect to time and change. For example, consistency constraints in
universes containing closed timelike curves are often appealed to as non-causal
explanations for why someone in such a world is unable to kill their younger
self, despite clearly associated with time and change. Given the complexity of
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the relationship between global consistency constraints such as this and tempo-
ral change and evolution, Ben-Menahem’s rule of thumb is ultimately hard to
apply one way or the other.
Nonetheless, the debate about the role of putatively noncausal explanations
in science has been active for several years and the token examples used of such
explanations overlap with the kinds of constraints that Ben-Menahem deems
‘causal’, so further discussion here is merited. One might perhaps think that the
kinds of constraints appealed to are causal in nature in that they are ultimately
describe the large-scale features of causal processes — after all, symmetry prin-
ciples hold only insofar as they accurately describe the behaviour of dynamical
systems. Within the literature on non-causal explanations, there is a variety of
approaches to how causal and non-causal explanations are related. As Reutlinger
(2017) notes: reductivists take non-causal explanations to be causal explanations
in disguise, as just described in the case of symmetry principles; pluralists take
both causal and non-causal explanations to be autonomous kinds of legitimate
scientific explanation; andmonists take there to be an underlying structure of ex-
planation that both causal and non-causal explanations exhibit. Ben-Menahem’s
account doesn’t neatly fit this set of options, primarily because what is deemed
‘causal’ within the book appears to be incorporate many kinds of constraint often
deemed non-causal.
Returning to the topic of the Pauli exclusion principle, Ben-Menahem notes it
as being used as a token ‘noncausal’ explanation by Railton (1978), Salmon (1989),
and Lange (2016). In response, Ben-Menahem notes that the exclusion princi-
ple is not properly described as noncausal since it ‘does not spring from purely
mathematical considerations’ (p. 114). She adds ‘[m]athematics cannot, by itself,
account for the existence of particles that are indistinguishable from one another,
act in conformity with Fermi-Dirac statistics, and are excluded from occupying
the same state’ (ibid), instead contending that the principle stems frommanifestly
causal considerations, such as locality, and moreover has been ‘very successfully
used as a causal constraint’ (p. 115). Here there is theworry that this issuemay be
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terminological in nature — after all, Lange distinguishes non-causal explanations
by constraint as distinct from ‘purely mathematical’ explanations. But what ap-
pears key here is the actual use of causal considerations and causal reasoning in
the development and establishment of the principle. This is reflective of the gen-
eral practice-first approach to science endorsed within the book, fitting with the
approach of Frisch (2014) by focusing on the causal aspects involved in scientific
practice and scientific reasoning when discovering or confirming more abstract
principles like the exclusion principle.
Perhaps there’s a certain arbitrariness to this — after all, what’s in a name?
If one takes ‘causality’ to necessarily refer to the satisfying of certain axioms
like locality, screening-off, and so on, then things like global consistency con-
straints will not be deemed ‘causal’. On the other hand, if we take a looser ac-
count of what counts as ‘causal’, and we wish to distinguish constraints that are
apparently mathematical from those that are dynamical — such as constraining
change over time of objects —, then it is useful to call certain global constraints
as ‘causal’. Is this then just a terminological matter? And does the apparent arbi-
trariness or vagueness as to the label ‘causal’ simply echo the problems raised by
the likes of Kirchhoff and Mach and other causal eliminativists who ultimately
saw causal terms as responsible for letting too much obscurity into scientific dis-
course? Ultimately, a key lesson to extract from the book is not to hang too
much metaphysical baggage on the notion of causation; to instead treat ‘causal’
as something of a family resemblance concept, one that is pluralistic and does not
obviously admit of some set of necessary and sufficient conditions. It is certain
that there is something about the kinds of constraints considered in this book,
their interrelations, and how they have been used in the development of the
physical theories, that plays a special role in how we reason about the world and
about how physics implies the world is structured. And through understanding
causation in science in this way, the book offers an important new resource.
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